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In this article we suggest that the result of a strategic decision-making (SDM) 
process  is  not  only  an  initial  decision,  but,  more  importantly,  also  strategic 
momentum. With this concept we mean a combination of insights gained in the 
issue at hand and the collective commitment created to act on the decision and to 
use those insights to subsequently adapt the actions where necessary. The more 
turbulent the context of the SDM process, the less relevant the initial decision 
becomes and the more relevant the strategic momentum that results from that 
process.  We hypothesise that the higher the quality of the SDM process, the 
stronger the resulting strategic momentum will be and that SDM process quality 
is driven by rational, political and cultural behaviour.  
We  have  developed  this  perspective  on  SDM  on  the  basis  of  existing 
literature  and  have  explored  it  in  a  detailed  evaluation  of  six  SDM-cases  in 
European multinational firms. This evaluation has confirmed in many respects 
the relation between high process quality and strong strategic momentum. For 
instance, we have found a strong correlation between the level of rationality in 
the decision making process and the levels of insight and collective commitment 
achieved.  We  also  have  found  that  cultural  behaviour  stressing  open 
communication coincides with high levels of collective commitment. For some 
other causal relations our data set is too limited in range or simply inconclusive, 
such as for the impact of political behaviour on strategic momentum. 
A surprising finding from our evaluation concerns the sustainability of strong 
strategic momentum. In a second wave of evaluation interviews, some four to six 
years later, we found high levels of strategic momentum still to exist with the 
original participants in the SDM process. Opportunities for further research as 
well as limitations to the findings presented are discussed.   2 
 
“Those who triumph, 
Compute at their headquarters 
A great numbers of factors 
Prior to a challenge.” 
“It is therefore natural that in a business such as war, which 
in its plan – built upon general circumstances – is so often 
thwarted by unexpected and singular incidents, more must 
generally be left to talent; and less use can be made of a 
theoretical guide than in any other.” 
 
Sun Tzu, in The art of War.  
Originally around 660 B.C. (Wing 1989, p.27) 
Carl von Clausewitz, in On War. 
Originally 1832: (von Clausewitz 1997, p.90) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Strategic Decision-Making (SDM), by which in this article we mean decision-making regarding 
major organisational issues, has for quite some time been an important subject in both the fields 
of organisation theory (Hatch, 1997) and strategic management (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece, 
1994; Papadakis and Barwise, 1998). SDM, therefore, has been extensively researched over the 
years (see, e.g., Rajagopalan, Rasheed and Datta, 1993, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992, Swenk, 
1995). This interest in SDM has been largely based on the received wisdom that sound strategic 
decision-making is likely to lead to desirable organisational outcomes.  
Not surprisingly, quite some research has been dedicated to a better understanding of the 
relation between “sound SDM” and “desirable outcomes”. In general, research in this area has 
attempted to establish links between four basic factors: content, process, context and outcome 
(Bell, Bromily and Bryson, 1998). A strategic decision is made with regard to a certain major 
issue  (content),  during  a  particular  process  and  resulting  in  a  certain  outcome,  while  being 
influenced by its context, by which is meant both the organisational environment of the decision-
making  process  and  the  environment  of  the  organisation  in  which  it  takes  place.  Empirical 
research into the relations between SDM-processes and SDM-outcomes has flourished during the 
past  decade  (e.g.,  Woolridge  and  Floyd,  1990;  Korsgaard,  Schweiger  and  Sapienza,  1995; 
Montgomery, Wernerfelt and Balakrisnan, 1989; Dean and Sharfman, 1993a, 1993b, 1996 and 
Nutt, 1993a, 1993b).  
Unfortunately, most of this research on the process-outcome relation is based on what we call 
a  choice-focus,  i.e., SDM-outcomes  are  defined  in  terms  of  the  actual  choice  made  and  the 
contribution of this choice to business objectives. However, in turbulent settings such a choice 
tends to be unstable, as it is often, as reality unfolds, adapted to this unfolding reality (see e.g. 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988, and Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998). In such settings, a SDM 
research model is better based on a change focus. Here, SDM-outcomes are not defined in terms 
of a specific choice but rather on the resulting ability of the organisation to deal with the issue at 
hand and thus the ability to change the organisational activities in the right direction. 
We see as the outcome of a sound SDM-process an initial decision plus strategic momentum, 
defined as the combination of insights in the issue at hand and the collective commitment to act 
on the decision taken and to use those insights to adapt the actions where necessary. With respect 
to the SDM-process, we distinguish rational, political and cultural behaviour as drivers of SDM 
process quality, in line with Tichy’s well-known TPC-model (Tichy, 1983). This model has 
originally been developed to deal with issues of strategic organisational change but can also be 
used for analysing SDM-process quality on the basis of a change-focus as we have done. 
We have used our research model in six explorative case studies of strategic decision-making 
processes and outcomes within a context of turbulence. In our case analyses, we have measured 
the impact of the three drivers of SDM-process quality on the resulting strategic momentum. We 
have found that strategic momentum can indeed be a sustainable outcome of an SDM-process. 
That  is,  we  have  found  that  high-quality  SDM  processes  tend  to  lead  to  a  sustained 
organisational ability to deal with the strategic issue in question for several years onwards. To   3 
establish  this  we  have  conducted  two  waves  of  evaluation  interviews,  one  shortly  after  the 
decision-making process and one four to six years later. 
 
RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
In this article we mean by SDM: decision-making regarding major issues, or, in the words of 
Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Théoret (1976, p. 246) regarding issues that are “important, in terms 
of the actions taken, the resources committed, or the precedents set”. Pennings portrays such 
decisions as “significant, unstructured, complex, collective and consequential” (Pennings, 1985, 
p. 6). The classic approach to SDM, to which authors can be grouped such as Ansoff (1965), 
Andrews  (1971),  Miles  and  Snow  (1978)  and  Porter  (1980),  focused  on  the  content  of  the 
strategic decision. It stressed the use of rational decision-making processes and developed a 
series  of  powerful  analytical  tools  like  SWOT-analysis,  the  Boston  Consulting  Group’s 
growth/share matrix, industry analysis and sophisticated quantitative modelling to evaluate – 
mostly in financial terms – decision alternatives. In this approach, the decision-making process 
was seen as a linear sequence of steps, leading from problem recognition to the final choice. 
Hence the term “linear model” by Chaffee (1985). This classical approach had clear normative 
ambitions:  sound  rational  strategic  decision-making  should  lead  to  the  desired  long-term 
business results. 
Subsequent empirical and more descriptive research has greatly enriched our understanding 
of  actual  strategic  decision-making  (see,  e.g.  Rajagopalan,  Rasheed  and  Datta,  1993,  or 
Papadakis and Barwise, 1998). In the context of the present article, we will focus our review of 
the literature on the following five clusters of findings from this body of research: 
1.  SDM-processes are not only rational, but also political and cultural in nature. 
2.  SDM content and context also drive the nature of the decision process and their outcomes. 
3.  A change, rather than a choice focus, seems appropriate in turbulent settings. 
4.  SDM is not a mechanistic linear process, but an organic one with many feedback loops. 
5.  Causal linkages between SDM processes and outcomes are complex. 
 
1. SDM-processes are not only rational, but also political and cultural in nature 
We have learned that SDM-processes often prove to be rational only to a certain extent. They 
can range on a continuous scale from purely rational to “very boundedly rational” (see e.g. 
Harrison and Philips, 1991). At the rational end of this scale, actors have known objectives, 
gather comprehensively the necessary information, develop alternative actions, choose rationally 
and  implement.  At  the  other  end,  they  may  perform  similar  actions  but  do  so  much  less 
thoroughly.  At  this  end,  they  even  may  consciously  use  irrationality  in  order  to  control 
subsequent action (due to differences between what can be said and what can be done, Brunsson, 
1993). The degree of rationality is seen by  some authors as contingent on  context (see  e.g. 
Mintzberg and Waters, 1982; Fredrickson, 1984; Dean and Sharfman, 1993b). 
We now know that SDM-processes dealing with major issues for the organisation tend to be 
influenced by political processes: (groups of) actors defend their sub-interests by using their 
formal  or  informal  power  (see  e.g.  Pettigrew,  1973,  Quinn,  1980;  Pfeffer,  1981  and  1992; 
Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). Where political processes are important, the resulting choices 
or actions may seem irrational in view of overall organisational objectives. Their rationality 
stems  from  conflicting  sub-interests.  Interestingly,  Dean  and  Sharfman  (1993a)  found  the 
political  processes  to  be  independent  from  the  rational  ones:  processes  that  scored  high  on 
politics could also have strong rational elements.    4 
We also know that SDM-processes occur within an organisational context, which causes not 
only political behaviour, as discussed above, but also what may be called “cultural behaviour”, 
i.e. behaviour under the influence of the “programming of the mind” of people as a result of their 
social environment (Hofstede, 1991).  Furthermore, this context leads to behaviour that takes 
into consideration the social and cultural aspects of achieving things with and through other 
members of the own social group. This cultural behaviour is driven by various socialisation 
processes within the organisation at large (Tichy, 1983; Guth and MacMillan, 1986; Woolridge 
and Floyd, 1990; Mintzberg, 1990). Moreover, SDM-outcomes can also be strongly influenced 
by specific modes of cultural behaviour at the group and interpersonal level. Examples of this are 
group think (Janis, 1982), cognitive bias (Das,  1999), interpersonal conflict (Amason, 1996, 
Eisenhardt,  Kahwajy  and  Bourgeois,  1997),  perceived  procedural  fairness  (Korsgaard, 
Schweiger and Sapienza, 1995), differences in structuring of SDM group processes (McGrath, 
1984; Schweiger, Sandberg and Rechner, 1989), and the degree of participation in the SDM-
process (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990). 
 
2.  SDM  content  and  context  also  drive  the  nature  of  the  decision  process  and  their 
outcomes 
Empirical research has shown that SDM content and context can have an impact on the character 
of the decision-making process.  Hickson et al. (1986) define three modes of decision-making on 
the basis of differences in content. The impact of context on both SDM process and outcome 
have also been noted by Dutton, Fahey and Narayanan (1983), Hitt and Tyler, (1991), Bryson 
and Bromily (1993), Rajagopoalan et al. (1993), Nutt (1993a and 1993b), Sharfman and Dean 
(1998)  and  Papadakis  et  al.  (1998).  Nutt  (2000)  has  researched  the  influence  of  context  on 
strategies to uncover alternatives. 
In the context of the present article, of specific interest is the focus on turbulent environments, 
or high-velocity environments, as Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) labelled them. Turbulence as 
a  concept  was  introduced  in  a  classical  article  by  Emery  and  Trist  (1965),  who  defined 
turbulence  in  an  organisation’s  environment  as  the  combination  of  complexity  and  rate  of 
change. A high rate of change in a non-complex context may not pose severe problems, but in a 
complex setting it usually does. In such turbulent contexts, decisions need continually be adapted 
as that situation evolves over time. 
The interest in turbulent contexts has been reinforced lately by the recent literature on 
complex adaptive systems (Waldropp, 1992, Kaufmann 1995, Axelrod, 1997, Holland, 1998).  It 
has been argued that companies operating in these kinds of settings need to be able to constantly 
manoeuvre along “the edge of chaos” (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998, Stacey, 1995) and improvise 
as they move forward in an ever-changing environment (Eisenhardt, 1998). Clearly, this strongly 
influences the nature of the decision-making process and the kinds of organisational outcomes 
that can be expected. 
3. A change, rather than a choice focus, seems appropriate in turbulent settings 
If one wants to study the impact of SDM process quality on SDM-outcomes one has to define 
what is meant by outcome. Often, the actual decision itself is regarded as the primary outcome of 
any SDM-process and the value of that decision is judged on the basis of its contribution to long 
term business objectives. In this SDM-research tradition, the actual choice is “the high point of 
the decision-making process” (Harrison, 1987, p53). We may call this approach research on the 
basis of a choice-focus. 
However, a decision as a clear choice made at a specific point in time may well be an 
elusive phenomenon in actual organisational life. As early as in 1962, Folsom remarked that it 
“is often hard to pinpoint the exact stage at which a decision is reached. More often than not, the   5 
decision comes naturally during discussions, when the consensus seem to be reached among 
those  whose  judgement  and  opinion  the  executive  seeks”  (Folsom  1962,  p.84).  More 
importantly, organisational decision-making is often conducted in a turbulent setting, resulting in 
an  inherent  instability  of  any  decision  taken:  when  circumstances  change  one  may  want  to 
reconsider decisions, already made and to start a new round of decision-making.  
Mintzberg and Waters (1990) have forcefully made the same point: the concept of decision 
itself is problematic. Even when not regarded as a choice but as a commitment to act (Mintzberg 
et al. 1976), a decision leaves few traces in the organisation: its timing and organisational locus 
tend to be diffuse, the connection between decision (if located) and action is problematic and 
action without decision is possible. So, argue Mintzberg and Waters, the concept of decision can 
“get in the way” of understanding organisational behaviour (1990, p.5).  
An interesting approach to handle decision-making in turbulent settings has been developed 
by Sharfman and Dean (1997). While sticking to their choice-focus, they regard flexibility in 
decision-making as the answer to turbulence. This means flexibility (in their model through 
openness to new information and through recursion in the SDM-process) before a decision is 
made. 
Another solution to these problems of turbulence – and the one used in our model - is to 
abandon  the  choice-focus  and  to  adopt  a  change-focus  (Pettigrew,  1990),  which  means 
essentially  adaptations  after  an  initial  decision  has  been  made.  This  approach  is  close  to 
Chaffee’s (1985) adaptive model of decision-making. Such an emphasis on change can already 
be  found  in  earlier  SDM-research,  in  which  the  formulation-implementation  dichotomy  is 
rejected (Mintzberg and Quinn, 1992). Instead, it is asserted that it is rarely the case that a single 
decision, taken at a specific point in time, leads to improved long-term business performance. 
Rather, such performance improvements are achieved through a series of states, where in each 
subsequent state there is renewed decision-making, which means additional analyses, leading to 
implementation  activities,  new  experiences  and,  again,  to  renewed  decision-making.  Such 
insights have led to conceptualisations such as “muddling through” (Lindblom, 1959) or “logical 
incrementalism” (Quinn, 1980, 1989).  
In a more general sense, this research tradition is related to the concept of organisational 
learning  (Argyris  and  Schön,  1978;  de  Geus,  1988;  Senge  1990):  subsequent  states  can  be 
reached  by  the  organisation  because  of  what  has  been  learnt  in  previous  states.  Here  the 
contributions by Stacey (1995) also deserve mention, who holds – following complexity theory - 
that  in  settings  far-from-equilibrium,  organisations  are  confronted  with  severe  cognitive 
limitations in finding the “best” solution  and hence tend to use more heuristic and learning 
procedures to find solutions, often involving initial small-scale experimenting. 
 
4. SDM is not a mechanistic linear process, but an organic one, with many feedback loops  
Not just in turbulent settings, but in most real-life contexts, the classical linear model is unlikely 
to be detected in SDM-processes. Rather, such real-life processes are better described as series of 
process steps with feedback and feed-forward loops (Witte, 1972; Mintzberg, Raisinghani and 
Théoret, 1976). Or, they may be even further removed from the linear sequence by taking the 
character of an organised anarchy, such as in the garbage-can model of Cohen, March and Olsen, 
1972 (see also March and Weissinger-Baylou, 1986; Magjuka, 1988; Lewitt and Nass, 1989). 
 Chaffee has attempted to develop a synthesis of various SDM-process models on the basis 
of  Bouldings  (1956)  nine-level  systems  hierarchy.  She  distinguishes  three  process  models. 
Firstly, the linear model, focusing on a specific choice at the end of a linear sequence of steps, 
belonging  to  Boulding’s  machine-level.  Secondly,  the  adaptive  model  of  decision-making 
processes  leading  to  continuous  adaptation  to  a  changing  environment.  This  belongs  to  the 
biological level. And, thirdly, the interpretative model, in which the organisation is seen as based   6 
on social contracts among stakeholders, reality is socially constructed and SDM-processes are 
used to legitimise action. This model would belong to Boulding’s cultural level. 
 
5. Causal relations between SDM process and outcomes are complex 
Most of the empirical research that has attempted to arrive at a better understanding of the causal 
linkages between SDM process and its outcomes has focused on specific aspects. For instance, 
Woolridge and Floyd (1990) showed that involvement of middle management in SDM increases 
their commitment with the resulting decisions. Amason (1996) revealed that conflict during the 
SDM process can improve decision quality, since it can eventually lead to better understanding 
as well as, eventually, to more consensus and acceptance. Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza 
(1995)  demonstrated  that  perceived  procedural  fairness  could  lead  to  more  consensus  and 
commitment.  
Research linking SDM-process with overall outcomes is scarce. A very early example is Trull 
(1966), who concluded on the basis of 100 case-studies that total decision success (defined as 
“primarily  economic  attainment”;  Trull,  1996,  p  B-272)  equals  Decision  Quality  plus 
Implementation, both concepts operationalised through a number of indicators. More recent is 
the work by Nutt and by Dean and Sharfman. Nutt analysed for 163 decision-cases the process 
tactics that managers use to take decisions and linked the four types of tactics he distinguishes 
with decision success, which he operationalises by decision adoption, merit and duration (Nutt, 
1993a, 1993b). Dean and Sharfman concluded on the basis of an analysis of 61 decisions that 
SDM-process quality does indeed influence decision effectiveness (Dean and Sharfman, 1996). 
They also found that the degree of rationality in that process depends on context (competitive 
threat, perceived external control and uncertainty (Dean and Sharfman, 1993b) and that rational 
and political sub-processes in SDM need not interfere with one another (Dean and Sharfman, 
1993a).  
 
RESEARCH MODEL AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this section we operationalise our research model. Figure 1 summarises it graphically. We will 
explain its components one by one.  
Strategic momentum: insight and collective commitment 
The concept of decision 
As we are interested in SDM in turbulent settings we do not employ a choice focus but a change 
focus. We still use “decision” as a concept, as it doesn’t need to get in the way of understanding, 
as we will see, and as it is still a very powerful concept. Not only do organisations make strategic 
choices like diversification, the establishment or closure of facilities or mergers and acquisitions 
(even if place and timing of such choices are diffuse), but strategic decisions are also empirical 
realities  in  the  sense  that  they  figure  prominently  in  most  real  life  strategic  discourses  (see 
Hendry, 2000, on the importance of the concept of “decision” in such discourses). 
   We see, however, an organisational decision not only as a “commitment to act” (as Mintzberg 
et. al, 1976, do), but as a design and a commitment to act. We agree with Mintzberg et al. that 
organisational commitment is a defining property of an organisational decision, but at the same 
























Figure 1: The research model: Rational, political and cultural behaviour lead to strategic 
momentum, which is a combination of insights gained and collective commitment. 
 
 
by whom of the intended action. This is not to reify the concept of organisational decision. SDM 
is a process of organisational actors, usually key actors in the organisation. An organisational 
decision, then, is a design for action to which a significant number of key actors is committed. 
Using a change focus and these two defining properties of an organisational decision we define 
as the outcome of a SDM-process an initial decision plus the resulting strategic momentum, i.e. 
the combination of the insights developed in the strategic issue at hand and the commitment of 
key actors to act on that decision and to use those insights to adapt the necessary actions where 
necessary. Strategic momentum is a term already used by Miller and Friesen (1980; 1982), but 
these authors see it as an inherent property of the organisation as a whole, entrepreneurial firms 
having more of it than conservative ones. In this article, we see it as something that can be 
developed through a high-quality SDM-process. Strategic momentum gives the organisation the 
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In our research model, the desired outcome of an SDM process in a turbulent setting is a group 
of people who have learned a great deal about the issue at stake and feel committed to translate 
these insights into actions whenever the time is right for doing so. This is what we have labelled 
“strategic momentum”. This construct is a combination of two separate, yet indirectly related 
indicators: the level of insights gained, without which no sensible decisions can be taken, and the 
level of collective commitment, without which sensible decisions may not get implemented. 
Insight 
Argyris’ and Schön’s (1978) distinction between “single and double loop” learning has only 
gained in relevance in the past twenty years. For, increasingly, the challenge for management 
teams is not so much to tackle similar issues over time, but rather to rethink again and again their 
way of tackling issues, their problem-solving method. Therefore, the two indicators used in our 
research  model  are  single  and  double  loop  learning.  We  have  operationalised  these  as  (1) 
problem insight and (2) appreciation of problem solving method. The former refers to the degree 
in which participants felt they acquired new insights regarding the issue at stake. The second 
concerns the degree in which they have acquired a better appreciation of the systems thinking-
based  approach  (Senge  1990,  Sterman  and  Morecroft  1994,  Vennix  1996)  that  was  used  to 
facilitate  the  SDM  processes  investigated  here  with  which  all  stakeholders  were  unfamiliar 
beforehand.  
Collective commitment 
Apart from the cognitive process of obtaining a thorough understanding of the issue at stake, the 
emotions  of  stakeholders  need  to  be  engaged  as  well.  This  is  where  the  concept  collective 
commitment comes in. We distinguish three related indicators for this concept: (1) commitment, 
(2) consensus and (3) ownership. 
(1).  Commitment.  The  construct  commitment  has  been  investigated  frequently  in  SDM 
research (c.f. Amason 1996, Korsgaard et al. 1995, Woolridge and Floyd 1990). This indicator 
stands for the degree in which stakeholders feel determined to translate the insights gained from 
the SDM process into informed actions. This is more than just paying lip service: as the popular 
saying  goes,  in  baking  a  ham  omelette,  the  chicken  is  involved  but  the  pig  is  genuinely 
committed. 
(2). Consensus. Next to individual commitment there also has to be consensus amongst the 
key stakeholders regarding the above-mentioned insights and how these should be translated into 
action. Like commitment, consensus is also frequently investigated in empirical SDM research, 
starting with Bourgeois (1980), progressing with Woolridge and Floyd (1990) and continuing up 
to the present day with Amason (1996) and Schwenk (1998).  
(3). Ownership. Our third indicator for collective commitment is ownership, by which we 
mean the degree in which participants feel the insights are an intellectual outcome from a process 
in  which  they  themselves  participated  actively. Authors  from  diverse  fields,  such  as  Ackoff 
(1979), Schein (1969), De Geus (1988, 1997) and Senge (1990) have stressed the importance of 
this indicator for group commitment.  
 
Drivers of process quality: rational, political and cultural behaviour 
On the basis of our literature review, we assume that SDM-process quality is driven by rational, 
political and cultural behaviour. More precisely, we hypothesise that one will consistently obtain 
the above defined desired outcomes of an SDM-process if the actors behave rationally, abstain 
from political behaviour and “act culturally”, i.e. take in their behaviour into consideration the 
social and cultural aspects of achieving things with and through other members of the own social 
group. This hypothesis is in line with our change focus and follows Tichy’s (1983) TPC-model   9 
in  which  strategic  organisational  change  is  driven  by  technical  (i.e.  rational),  political  and 
cultural interventions. 
Rational behaviour 
Here we followed closely the operationalisations of  Dean and Sharfman (1993a, 199b, 1996). 
To assess the importance of this sub-process, we used three indicators: (1) completeness (the 
degree in which all the relevant data were considered), (2) thoroughness (the degree in which all 
the required analyses were conducted) and (3) focus (the degree in which discussions were felt to 
be centred around the key issues).  
 
Political Behaviour 
Here we again stayed close to Dean and Sharfman (1993a, 199b, 1996), who pioneered empirical 
research on the interplay of rationality and politics in SDM. We used two indicators to measure 
the  degree  in  which  political  behaviour  was  important.  The  first  is  the  degree  in  which 
participants  saw  (discussing)  the  issue  as  threatening  to  their  own  position  in  the  company 
(political sensitivity), the second one is the inverse of the degree in which discussions were felt 
to be open, inhibited by ulterior motives (open communication). This view is consistent with the 
broader recent SDM literature such as Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois (1997). 
Cultural behaviour 
By this we mean the degree in which stakeholders are (1) willing to participate actively in the 
SDM process (willingness to co-operate) and the degree in which (2) they actually are involved 
in the discussions (involvement). We based these indicators on Woolridge and Floyd (1990) and 
Rajagopalan et al. (1998 who both stress the need for involvement of the key players. Both 
Amason (1996) and Eisenhardt et al. (1997) have pointed at the positive effects of cognitive 
conflicts, or, having a good and open debate, on performance. 
 
Antecedents and results of SDM: turbulence and business results 
Turbulence 
Following  the  classical  article  of  Emery  and  Trist  (1965),  we  define  turbulence  in  an 
organisation’s environment as the combination of complexity and rate of change. In our research 
model, we have operationalised these in two factors; (1) problem complexity (how complex was 
the strategic issue perceived) and (2) problem urgency (how urgently was a solution to the issue 
needed in the organisation).  
Business results 
We have operationalised this variable similar to Dean and Sharfman’s (1993a, 199b, 1996) and 
Woolridge and Floyd’s (1990) questions regarding decision effectiveness. Dean and Sharfman 
asked managers to rank a number of pre-defined issues to address by the SDM process in terms 
of  their  importance  and  the  quality  of  their  implementation  after  the  SDM  process.  In  our 
research, we have simply asked respondents to what extent decisions made during the SDM 
process have been implemented in the organisation. We have labelled this indicator decision 
implementation. 
   10 
Multiple causal linkages and feedback between stages 
The process that Figure 1 describes is not one-off, but rather an ongoing process with multiple 
feedback loops. In this ongoing process, experiences with the results of actions are fed back into 
the SDM-process, possibly resulting in a new round of decision-making. This may then affect 
again  the  strategic  momentum  that  was  created  at  the  previous  round.  It  is  the  strategic 
momentum surviving from the previous round of decision-making that is adjusted by this new 
SDM round. This also implies that the sustainability of the strategic momentum is a key issue. If 
strategic momentum dies out soon, it will be of little value to the organisation. 
 
Research questions 
On  the  basis  of  the research  model  of  Figure  3  we  can  define  the  following  three research 
questions: 
Q1.  What  is  the  relation  between  strategic  momentum  and  subsequent 
organisational actions? 
Q2.  What are the relations between the three drivers of SDM-process quality and 
the resulting strategic momentum? 
Q3.  To  what  extent  is  strategic  momentum  sustainable  and  how  does  that 





Multiple case studies for theory building.   
The research reported here has been aimed at generating new theory on the basis of existing 
theoretical constructs. As we noted in the literature review, our specific research aim has been a 
novel one. For, although the topic of SDM and its impact on organisational performance has 
been extensively researched, there is very little empirical research from a change perspective that 
attempts to arrive at an integrated view of the SDM process. Even more so, the impact that 
turbulent settings have on this process and its outcomes is a new research angle for empirical 
SDM research. 
 For theory building, employing a research design of multiple case studies would appear to be 
a logical choice from a methodological perspective. As has been noted repeatedly, case studies 
“provide  the  intimate  connection  with  empirical  reality  that  permits  the  development  of  a 
testable, relevant and valid theory”. (Eisenhardt 1989, p.532). This is certainly true in the case of 
strategic decision-making by multiple stakeholders in turbulent settings; a complex and fast-
unfolding phenomenon by any standard. It is therefore not surprising that the research design 
employed by Eisenhardt for her research into the turbulent world of the computer industry, i.e, 
using between 4 and 12 different cases of SDM that share some essential characteristics but 
differ clearly in others, has formed a template for our research design (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 
1988, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988). 
Action research for validity and relevance.   
Being intimately connected with empirical reality is often problematic for an outside researcher 
in  the  case  of  strategic  decision-making  in  turbulent  settings.  The  issues  involved  are  often 
sensitive, the content matter tends to be complicated, the stakeholders are many in number, often   11 
time-pressed  and  not  easily  accessible  and  the  SDM  process  progresses  with  unpredictable 
timing. Therefore, employing an action research design (Reason and Bradbury 2000) has definite 
advantages  over  a  more  “hands-off”  approach.  In  this  research  project,  the  first  author  was 
actively involved as a consultant to the management of all the companies investigated.  
Apart from the ability to observe events up close as they unfolded, this choice for an action 
research  perspective  also  has  other  well-noted  advantages.  Firstly,  it  provides  the  ability  to 
observe up close an organisation during a period of strong instability, while it is experiencing its 
periods of most drastic change, when normally often no outsiders would be allowed. As Kurt 
Lewin probably noted first: if you want to understand how something works, try to change it 
(Lewin  1997).  
Secondly, it ensures the direction of the research to be of guaranteed managerial relevance, 
since company management is closely involved in the research effort as it progresses (Gill 1983). 
And thirdly, it indirectly generates the close relations and common understanding that enable 
researchers to revisit the company after they are no longer involved directly. It has been noted 
that this rapport with management is important during subsequent periods of change to observe 
and  reflect  with  members  of  the  organisation  on  ultimate  causes  and  consequences  of  the 
changes observed (Miles and Huberman 1984). In the case of this research, it enabled access to 
the  decision-makers  involved,  who  by  then  were  often  scattered  throughout  their  respective 
organisations, up to six years after the original decision-making process had taken place.  
Overcoming reliability limitations of action research.   
Precisely the same characteristics that make case study research in general, and action research 
in particular, so well-suited to study SDM processes also generate considerable problems in 
ensuring sufficient reliability. By reliability we mean the degree in which statements are based 
on  a  careful  observation  of  reality,  rather  than  on  accidental  circumstances  regarding 
measurement instruments or the researchers’ own biases as people being personally involved 
(Yin  1989).  For  our  research,  we  have  taken  several  measures  to  ensure  adequate  levels  of 
reliability.  In  general,  these  boil  down  to  limiting  personal  biases  by  employing  as  many 
independent  perspectives  and  sources  of  data  as  possible  in  an  iterative  process  of  data 
collection, analysis, reflection and synthesis. We will return to these further on.  
 
Theory-driven case selection 
In  our  selection  of  design,  we  followed  the  principle  of  theory-driven  case  sampling,  as 
developed by Yin (1989) and Eisenhardt (1989). Here one varies in case selection at much as 
possible on the key constructs of interest while keeping variation in constructs of secondary 
importance as low as possible. In this research, our interest has been to learn more about the 
impact of SDM process quality on performance. For this purpose, at least two types of cases are 
needed: ones where this quality was perceived as low and ones where quality was high. As it 
turned out, we found more variation across this scale: one very unsuccessful case and two very 
successful ones, with the remaining three ranking at different points in between. 
On the other hand, there are also variables that we wanted to remain constant across cases. 
One such variable was the degree of turbulence. In all cases studied, the SDM process was 
characterised by turbulence: in three cases the turbulence affected the industry as a whole, in the 
other three the turbulence was more generated by developments internal to the firm. One more 
was  the  type  of  methodical  guidance  for  the  decision-making  process:  the  stages  that  were 
distinguished in it, the structure of the group sessions and the types of analyses made.  In all 
cases  studied,  this  guidance  was  provided  by  a  systems  thinking-based  process  facilitation 
approach of group model-building (Senge 1990, Sterman and Morecroft 1994, Vennix 1996) that   12 
the second author had been trained in and had moulded into a proprietary consulting method 
(Akkermans 1995a, Akkermans and Vennix 1997).  
Data collection 
Multiple sources of data: project documents and interviews.   
To ensure construct validity as well as reliability we have collected data from different sources 
and in different formats (Miles and Huberman 1984, Yin 1989, Eisenhardt 1989). During the 
SDM process itself, relevant documents were collected and research notes were taken (Miles and 
Huberman 1984). Workshops sessions were recorded, transcripted and fed back to informants to 
check for correctness and completeness. After the formal part of the decision-making process 
had ended, evaluation interviews were conducted with the key stakeholders involved regarding 
the indicators listed in Table 1. These interviews were conducted with 3 up to 8 informants per 
case, with interviews lasting between 1 and 2 hours. These interviews were not conducted by the 
authors but by independent investigators. They were conducted 0-2 years after the SDM process 
had taken place, in 1994.  
 
Two waves of process evaluation to assess sustainability.  
To assess our third research question regarding the sustainability of the strategic momentum, a 
second wave of evaluation interviews was conducted, again by independent interviewers. These 
interviews took place in 1998; some four to six years after the original SDM process had come to 
completion. The same people that were interviewed back in 1994 were approached once more. 
Most of the original interviewees could be traced back, sometimes in different organisational 
settings. Interview questions were targeted towards the same indicators as four years earlier.  
Our interest in the present article is in establishing what remains of strategic momentum over 
time, not in how this momentum develops over the years. This is why we chose this considerable 
time gap between our observations. Of course, problems of recall and memory distortion are 
inevitable, certainly after such long time periods. Therefore, we only asked our respondents 
about their assessment of the SDM outcome variables, not on the contextual or process variables. 
Outcome variables persist up to the present day whereas questions about the SDM process refer 
by definition to a period a long time ago.  
 
Data analysis 
Qualitative data analysis 
The data analysis in this research was considerable. In the first wave of data gathering, a total of 
27 informants were used for post SDM-process interviews. This number was understandably 
lower in the second wave of data gathering in 1998, since many people had since then left their 
respective companies. Nevertheless, 10 separate interviews could be conducted to assess long-
term SDM outcomes. 
In  the  analysis  of  these  interview  data,  we  have  following  closely  the  recommendations 
provided in the classic textbook by Miles and Huberman (1984). We have aggregated data from 
the interview transcripts in a series of steps. A more detailed description of the elaborate data 
analytical process we went through is presented in Akkermans (1995a) and Akkermans and 
Vennix (1997). Here we will limit ourselves to outlining the main analytic steps. First, relevant 
scenes  from  each  transcript  have  been  coded  according  to  the  indicators  from  our  research 
model. Then, for each interviews these scenes have been summarised in a data display table 
(Miles and Huberman 1984, p.21-22), one column for each of the indicators.    13 
The summaries of these columns have then been clustered for all the transcripts available for 
this case and again a summary per indicators was made. Each summary contains both a short 
verbal description as well as a Likert-scale assessment for the value of that indicator, ranging 
from “--“ to “++”. This results in a table containing the summaries for each of the indicators 
belonging  to  an  overall  construct,  e.g.  collective  commitment,  for  one  case. These  indicator 
assessments have then been summarised once more into a single appraisal for the construct as a 
whole. It is these scores that appear in Tables 2-4. One single plus or minus here typically refers 
to several dozens of statements made by project informants during their respective interviews. 
Our presentation of the results of this data analysis in this article is in two ways. First there is 
the  table  format,  as  in  tables  2-4.  These  give  adequate  assessments  of  the  values  for  our 
constructs and indicators on a case by case basis. But, what these do not convey so well is the 
nature of the relationships between specific constructs across cases. And this is what we are 
looking for in our first two research questions. Therefore we have made use of scatter plots. 
Scatter plots are “figures that display data from all (cases) on two or more dimensions of interest 
that are related to one another. (…) Scatter plots are very useful when the analyst is trying out a 
hypothesis” (Miles and Huberman 1984, p.181-182). For this purpose, we have translated our 
Likert-scale assessments into a 5-point scale (-- being 1, ++ being 5) and have plotted case-by-
case values for two variables of interest at a time. 
Measures to ensure research reliability  
We have taken a number of specific steps to ensure sufficient levels of research reliability, which 
is often problematic in qualitative, case-based research, and especially in action research. In 
general, these boil down to ensuring an explicit change of perspective between the initial action 
research mode of operation and the subsequent case analysis phase.  
We  have  already  pointed  out  that  independent  evaluators  conducted  post-SDM  process 
interviews.  These  also  conducted  most  of  the  codification  and  analysis  of  the  transcripts  of 
sessions  and  interviews.  These  interviews  were  conducted  with  multiple  members  of  the 
organisation  coming  from  different  backgrounds,  to  provide  as  many  independent  different 
perspectives as possible. 
We conducted a member check on our preliminary case analyses by feeding back preliminary 
case-by case reports to our interview respondents and soliciting their comments on our synthesis 
of findings (Miles and Huberman 1984, Flick 1998). Finally, we ensured peer review (Flick 
1998) of our findings by discussing them back at the university with the second author’s Ph.D. 
Thesis committee, in the context of which this research was conducted, and by publishing case-
by-case  findings  in  peer-reviewed  academic  journals  (Akkermans  1993,  Akkermans  1995b, 
Akkermans et. al. 1996). 
 
SIX CASE-STUDIES OF STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
Similarities and dissimilarities between cases 
In  this  research  project  six  cases  were  evaluated.  They  share  many  common  characteristics. 
Firstly, all cases concern commercial firms facing a strategic issue. In the majority of cases (Case 
1, 3, 5 and 6) this issue was an operations issue, as that was one of the original content focus area 
of the research project. Secondly, in all cases the context was one of turbulence, be it primarily 
external turbulence, created by developments in the industry as a whole (cases 5 and 6), or 
internal  turbulence,  resulting  from  the  growth  crises  the  companies  in  question  were  going 
through (cases 1 and 3), or both (cases 2 and 4). This is summarised in Table 2.  
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TABLE 2 
Context, Content and Source of Turbulence for SDM Cases Investigated 
Case #  Industry context  Content of Issue  Source of Turbulence 
1  Publishing 
(Newspaper distribution) 
Operations strategy and 
redesign 
Internal: Consolidation of operations after major 
acquisition 
 
2  IT Services 
(Secondment) 
Organisational 
structure and culture 
Internal: Crowding out of local units after rapid 
growth 
External: Industry consolidation 
 
3  Pharmaceutics  
(Biotech) 
Operations strategy and 
design 
Internal: Huge increase in demand for drug 
expected after successful clinical trials while 
establishing activities in Europe 
 
4  IT Services  Corporate governance  Internal: Restructuring after merger and 
international expansion 
External: Industry consolidation 
 
5  Retail banking  Retail strategy and 
network redesign 
External: Industry consolidation; reallocation of 
retail instruments as a result of changing customer 
needs and technological advances 
 
6  Semiconductors  
(IC manufacturing) 
Supply chain strategy 
and redesign 
External: Increasing cyclicality of customer 
demand over time 
 
Thirdly,  in  all  six  cases  a  similar  problem  solving  method  was  applied,  group  model-
building on the basis of system dynamics modelling, which is an increasingly popular method of 
dealing  with  complex  business  issues  with  multiple  stakeholders  in  a  participatory  yet 
analytically driven manner (cf. Senge 1990, Sterman and Morecroft 1994, Akkermans 1995a, 
Akkermans 1995b, Vennix 1997). Fourtly, the first author was involved in all these cases in his 
role as part-time consultant with a Dutch IT consulting firm. Finally, in all cases concerned the 
activities in question took place in Europe, with The Netherlands as their centre.   
Despite these similarities in content and — at least intended —process, every case differed 
clearly from others in both contextual and outcome related aspects. For instance, some cases 
were very successful in terms of achieved state of strategic momentum achieved (Case 1, 5), 
whereas others were a clear failure (Case 4). In Case 1 several millions of direct savings were 
reported,  in  Case  3  the  company  almost  went  bankrupt  just  after  the  SDM  process  was 
completed. Other differences concern company size and industry sector: Cases 5 and 6 were with 
major  Dutch  multinationals  in  banking  and  high-tech  electronics,  Case  3  was  with  a  small 
American biotech firm that was setting up operations in Europe. Finally, the issues at stake also 
differed  in  scale  and  scope.  Overall,  the  issues  covered  in  the  later  cases,  4-6,  were  more 
ambitious and far-reaching that those tackled in the first three cases.  
We will now discuss each case briefly. In doing so, we will observe the following format. 
First we will point out the nature of the turbulence involved (see also Table 2) in light of the 
content and context of the SDM issue. Then we will consider the quality of the SDM process in 
terms of rationality, politics and culture. Finally, we discuss SDM outcomes in terms of strategic 
momentum achieved and organisational actions taken.  
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Case 1: Redesigning Operations in Newspaper Distribution 
SDM Content and context 
The company in question distributed international newspapers in the Netherlands. In itself, this 
was a fairly stable industry. Also, the content matter of this first case was a fairly straightforward 
one: the redesign of internal operations to accommodate the new demand levels. However, what 
made the context such a turbulent one is that the company had just merged with another one and 
that, as a result, its operational performance became so bad that bankruptcy seemed inevitable if 
things could not be turned around within a few months. So, the rate of change in this setting was 
very high indeed.  
SDM Process 
Regarding the SDM process, it should be noted that this was a relatively small company of a few 
hundred employees, part of a larger concern with a dominant entrepreneur-founder looking over 
the  shoulders  of  the  managers:  this  did  lead  to  considerable  political  strife  at  the  higher 
management level. This manifested itself at the very beginning of the SDM process, when two 
external consultants from different firms were brought in to support the operations manager, of 
whom the first author was one.  Nevertheless, on the factory floor willingness to co-operate was 
very high; people could see that their jobs were on the line, so politics remained pretty much in 
the periphery of the SDM process.   
Culturally and rationally speaking, the SDM process went well. A small team of four to five 
participants  engaged  in  a  series  of  group  problem  solving  sessions,  starting  with  problem 
conceptualisations  and  becoming  gradually  more  and  more  oriented  towards  quantitative 
analyses  bases  upon  those  conceptualisations.  Despite  the  initial  hesitations,  overall 
communication was quite open and involvement was good.  
SDM Outcomes 
The SDM outcomes were even better. Not only were high levels of learning reported as well as 
strong commitment for the study findings, but in this case the recommendations resulted in 
considerable performance improvements and cost reductions as well (Akkermans 1993). By the 
time of the second wave of data gathering, which was some six years later in this first case, the 
original operations manager had moved up the ladder and the company was again in good shape, 
making sound profits and with most of the original recommendations implemented. In fact, the 
insights gained in the original setting were now implemented in other business units as well.  
  
Case 2: Identifying Drivers of Management Behaviour in Professional Services 
SDM Content and context 
The organisation in question was a regional unit of a medium-size IT services company. In the 
highly decentralised and regionalised structure of this company, some eight managers of the 
business units in this region had, on the one hand, their own profit-and-loss responsibility. On 
the other hand, they had to collaborate, for instance in service development and when working 
for the same clients. This collaboration left quite something to desired and this then was the issue 
at stake: why were business unit managers not co-operating more and what could be done to 
make this happen? The reasons that this very complex issue became an urgent one were both 
internal and external. Internally, the company had enjoyed rapid growth in the past, partly thanks 
to its decentralised structure that allowed for fast scaling of activity levels. But recently, the 
market had become saturated with regional business units and more and more units began to   16 
compete  for  the  same  orders  with  the  same  customers,  which  caused  considerable  tension. 
Externally,  with  the  large  customers  this  company  wished  to  focus  upon  a  trend  became 
discernible  to  look  for  one-stop  shopping  with  their  IT  supplier  base,  which  would  require 
greater specialisation and collaboration between units of the IT supplier in question. In both 
cases, problem urgency, i.e., the rate of change, was considerable but not extreme: the company 
was still doing well and the market was still growing. 
SDM Process 
Perhaps partially a result of this relatively low problem urgency, the SDM process left some 
things  to  be  desired.  Five  workshops  were  conducted  with  the  group  of  managers  that 
collectively had to run this region, headed by the regional manager. Although this was a peer 
group of people who knew each other well, with no top management present, and therefore with 
little  political  behaviour  during  meetings,  involvement  was  certainly  not  optimal:  not  all 
participants showed up every time. Nevertheless, the group was quite successful in analysing 
why collaboration did not occur more often (Vennix, Akkermans and Rouwette 1996). Solutions 
to promote collaboration seemed to cut at the root of the decentralised way the company had 
been organised, which made coming up with good alternatives problematic. This explains why 
informants afterwards rated rational behaviour as medium.  
SDM Outcomes 
In line with the quality of the SDM process, SDM outcomes were assessed as medium also. 
Especially when asked six years later, collective commitment and insights from this project were 
felt to be low, although back in 1992 these had still received high marks (See Tables 3 and 4 
below). The insights gained from the formal part of the SDM process were not implemented in 
the  organisation  and,  in  fact,  the  company  in  question  has  for  many  years  afterwards  been 
struggling with inter-BU collaboration. 
 
Case 3: Designing a European Pharmaceutics Distribution Network and Strategy 
SDM Content and context 
The  content  matter  of  case  3  posed  some  interesting  design  issues:  how  does  one  design  a 
distribution  network  for  a  company  that  does  not  yet  exist  and  a  product  that  has  unique 
requirements  not  found  elsewhere?  The  context  of  this  SDM  situation  was  an  American 
biotechnology start-up firm setting up operations in Europe. In itself, the pharmaceutics industry 
was a fairly stable one, back in 1993. The turbulence in this case was generated internally: the 
company had developed a life-saving drug that has shown  spectacular efficacy results in its 
clinical  trials  so  far.  The  final  round  of  clinical  trials  required  by  the  Federal  Drug 
Administration would soon be finalised. As soon as similarly positive results were obtained and 
publicised, the company could expect to be swamped with demands for its drug. So, problem 
urgency was very high indeed. 
SDM Process 
At the time the formal SDM process started, the entire European organisation consisted of a 
nucleus  management  team  and  a  few  dozen  staff.  It  was  with  this  nucleus  that  the  SDM 
workshops were conducted.  
This was a process where politics played only  a minor part. If there were differences of 
opinion between the operations manager and the marketing manager or the general manager, 
these resulted in what Eisenhardt et al. label (1997) as “qualified consensus”. In practice, this 
meant that many of the logistics decisions were left to the operations manager, which resulted in   17 
low involvement from the marketing and clinical side in the strategic deliberations. However, 
this did not stop the team from making a number of thorough quantitative analyses which were 
also confirmed by independent external studies, so rational behaviour in this case was pretty 
good (Akkermans 1995b). 
SDM Outcomes 
The SDM outcomes of this case appear paradoxical at first sight. On the one hand we find high 
levels of insights gained and strong collective commitment, even five years later. But, on the 
other hand, we find no implementation whatsoever. The reason for this was that, in the end, the 
clinical trials everyone had expected to be over soon turned out to contain negative results for the 
efficacy of the promising drug. As a result, the company had to cut back operations drastically, 
came near bankruptcy and was sold off to a competitor the next year, quite irrespective of its 
splendid European distribution strategy. If there is one clear example of which a choice focus 
can be problematic in turbulent environments, here is a point in case. 
 
Case 4: Designing an Organisational Structure for Internationalisation of a professional 
Services Firm 
Content and context 
This case was with a different part of the same organisation in which Case 2 had taken place. 
However, the content-related and contextual differences with Case 2 were profound. Indeed, 
everything  appeared  to  be  different.  Firstly,  the  company  had  doubled  in  size  and  vastly 
increased its international presence after merging with the former internal IT department of a 
major Dutch multinational manufacturing company. The organisational change implications of 
this recent merge were a source of turbulence in itself. The strategic issue to be investigated 
concerned another internal origin of turbulence. This concerned the question how to set up an 
effective international corporate governance structure.  
Not  surprisingly,  this  made  the  context  for  this  case  a  highly  political  one.  In  the  SDM 
workshops that were to be conducted, both country managers and central functional managers 
were to be present, all newly appointed. Both the founder-CEO was present as well as his newly 
appointed successor. Finally, turbulence was also external: this process took place at a time when 
the entire European IT industry was in a state of flux as one merger or acquisition after another 
pointed at a period of consolidation.  
SDM Process 
In retrospect, given the extreme political sensitivity of the issue and the low problem tangibility, 
it was not surprising that the SDM sessions resulted in a complete failure. Discussions went 
nowhere  and  a  workshop  planned  for  two  days  was  broken  off  after the  first  day.  Political 
behaviour  was  ubiquitous  and,  culturally  speaking,  no  one  really  wanted  to  speak  openly.  
Obviously, as a result, most of the analyses that were originally planned did not take place.  
SDM Outcomes 
Not surprisingly either, the outcomes from this SDM process were rated as strongly negative. 
Little was learned about the issue, and the analytical findings that were obtained and written 
down in a final report were not shared with participants so obviously there was no collective 
commitment  regarding  their  implementation.  The  company  has  been  struggling  with  its 
internationalisation for several years until it was taken over by a larger competitor.  
   18 
Case 5: Evaluating Branch Office Network Effectiveness in Retail Banking  
SDM Content and context 
This fifth case was situated in the consumer banking industry. The strategic issue in this case 
concerned the alignment in size and composition of its branch office networks with size and 
distribution of its customer population. At the time, this usually implied closing or partially 
closing branch offices in less populated and affluent regions and removing specialised services 
from smaller branches. The turbulence in this case was therefore mainly external.  
Interestingly, this was a complete reversal from the strategy followed a decade before. As its 
competitors had done, but more extensively than those, the bank in question had then invested 
heavily  in  establishing  full-service  branch  offices  throughout  the  country,  only  to  find  that 
changing customer preferences and technological progress had invalidated this policy. In 1994, 
the  bank  in  question  and  its  competitors  were  all  in  the  process  of  cutting  cost  through 
rationalising their branch office networks. 
The content matter was technically complex and not really tangible, but the organisational 
context  was  favourable.  On  average  the  political  sensitivity  of  the  issue  was  low;  internal 
consultants specialising in this area as well as the branch office managers who participated in the 
effort were quite willing to co-operate. At the same time, problem urgency was high because the 
major cost-cutting exercise the company was undergoing the time spurred demand with local 
bank management teams for support for this type of strategic analysis.  
SDM Process 
In a series of some seven workshops, a group consisting of retail bank managers and internal 
consultants developed a sound analysis, codified in a well-documented and formalised model 
that could guide bank managers in making specific decisions regarding specific branch networks. 
The SDM process that was followed was exemplary. Although the issue was complex, all the 
required analyses were felt to have been made. Political behaviour remained very limited and 
cultural behaviour was strongly supportive and open. 
SDM Outcomes 
The outcomes of this SDM process have been very favourable indeed. In 1998, four years after 
the workshops, the model that was developed and in which all the relevant findings from the 
group were accumulated in computerised format was still operational and had been used several 
dozens of times. Collective commitment was still very high, as was participants’ assessment of 
the level of insight gained through this process. 
 
Case 6: Achieving Insight in Supply Chain Dynamics in the Semiconductor Industry  
SDM Content and context 
The content matter of this case is a notorious one in the high tech electronics industry: how to 
steer safely through the steep ups and downs of the business cycle. The company was a large 
European semiconductor manufacturer, with his home base in The Netherlands, itself part of a 
large electronics company. The issue at stake was how to achieve better insight into the drivers 
of business cycles, both in the short term and in the longer term, and derive recommendations for 
strategic supply chain design and co-ordination from those.  
As such, the SDM context for this case was mixed. On the one hand, politics was not an issue: 
the group of participants consisted of logistics managers, many of whom had known each other 
for  a  long  time  and  who  met  here  in  absence  of  their  business  managers.  But,  time  was   19 
increasingly pressing on this group precisely because of a steep upturn in the semiconductor 
business cycle and associated control problems for supply chain management. And yet, problem 
urgency could be formulated as modest because this particular project was never expected to 
solve the many pressing short-term supply chain control problems this company was facing. 
SDM Process 
This mixed picture in the context has seeped through in the SDM process and outcomes, it would 
seem. Communication in the group was very good, politics were non-existent and involvement 
was  good.  Yet  the  formal  SDM  process  was  abandoned  after  its  first  phase  of  problem 
conceptualisation because of the extreme time pressures the group was facing in their daily work. 
This made quite some of the analyses incomplete, resulting in only medium rational behaviour. 
SDM Outcomes 
This  mixed  picture  also  returns  in  our  findings  for  SDM  outcomes.  Evaluation  interviews 
conducted  after  the  formal  SDM  process  had  ended  show  considerable  learning  effects  at 
individual and group level as well as strong collective commitment to act upon those. But also, 
even four years later, very little implementation of the ideas generated in this effort had taken 
place.  Indeed, the business is as hectic as it ever was, making it very difficult to sit back and 
really think about the fundamental nature of the business cycle. According to some authors, this 
persistent inability to reflect upon longer-term trends may well, according to some authors, be in 
itself an important explanation for the viciousness of that very same business cycle (c.f. Forrester 
1961, Meadows 1970). 
 
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
In this section we contrast our research model with the results from our cross-case analysis. First, 
we  will  establish  that  these  were  indeed  six turbulent  settings  of  strategic  decision-making.  
Then, we will investigate the relation between the strength of the strategic momentum and the 
degree of implementation of decisions and will notice that this relation is problematic, as one 
could expect in a turbulent setting. Thirdly, we will look at the various ways in which SDM 
process aspects affect strategic momentum. And, finally, we assess the sustainability of strategic 
momentum over time. 
 
 
Six turbulent settings of SDM 
As  becomes  apparent  from  Table  2,  these  were  all  turbulent  settings  for  strategic  decision-
making. Only case 1 was rated by our case informants as just “complex”, not “very complex”, 
but, in this case, the rate of change experienced was such that bankruptcy was just around the 
corners if dramatic changes were not accomplished soon. 
 .  
Table 2 
Cross-Case Data on Indicators for SDM Turbulence 
Construct/Indicator  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6 
 
Problem complexity  +  ++  ++  ++  ++  ++ 
Problem urgency  ++  +/-  ++/-  +  +  +/- 
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Strategic momentum and organisational action 
Then we turn at the relations between strategic momentum and organisational action visualised 
in Figure 2. So far we have repeatedly noted that, conceptually speaking, the relation between a 
specific decision or choice in  an SDM process  and the organisational is a problematic one, 
especially in turbulent settings. This is confirmed by the patterns shown in Figure 2. The scores 
for both strategic momentum (insight and collective commitment) and organisational outcomes 
(decision implementation) are visualised here. (Data for these are listed in table 3). This plot 
shows that the answer to our first research question is a negative one: in these six cases, there 
was not a clear relation between strength of strategic momentum and subsequent organisational 
actions.  
Figure 2 
Scatter Plots of Insight and Collective Commitment versus Decision Implementation 
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The left plot shows case-by-case data pairs of the level of insight and organisational outcomes, 
i.e.,  decision  implementation.  The  right  graph  plots  collective  commitment  versus  decision 
implementation.  
Both plots show that there is no clear correlation in sight. If we look at the individual case 
evidence,  this  becomes  all  the  more  apparent.  In  one  case,  Case  3,  insights  and  collective 
commitment were fine but the company’s main product turned out to be worthless. In another, 
Case 6, strategic momentum was very high but higher management stopped implementation of 
the findings. In Case 2, quite some insights were gained but organisational actions would require 
a fundamental organisational redesign and hence did not take place.  
So, in all cases it was forces outside of the group of people directly involved in the SDM 
process that frustrated implementation; that is, turbulence. Although these are not shown in the 
plots, it should be noted that the longer-term scores for these indicators suggest even less a 
positive correlation between aspects of strategic momentum and organisational outcomes. 
 
Table 3 
Cross-Case Data on Indicators for SDM Process Constructs 
Construct/Indicator  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5  Case 6 
 
             
Rational behaviour  +  +/-  +  -  +  +/- 
•  Completeness  +/-  +/-  +/-  +/-  +  + 
•  Thoroughness  +  -  +  --/-  +/-  +/-   21 
•  Focus 
 
++  +  +  --  +  +/- 
Political Behaviour  -  -  -  ++/+  -/+  --/- 
•  Political Sensitivity   +/-  -/+  -/+  ++  -/+  - 
•  Openness of Communication* 
 
++  ++  ++  -  +  ++ 
 
Cultural Behaviour  +/-  +/-  +/-  -  +  ++ 
•  Willingness to co-operate  -/+  +  +  --  +  ++ 
•  Involvement 
 
+  +/-  -  -/+  +  ++ 
*: Inverse coding used in determining score for political behaviour 
 
Relations between process quality and strategic momentum 
Our  second  research  question  concerned  the  relation  between  process  quality  and  strategic 
momentum. Since we havem distinguished three aspects of process quality (rationality, politics 
and culture) and two aspects of strategic momentum (insights and collective commitment, this 
means looking at six scatter plots. These are shown in Figures 3 tot 4. These scatter plots are 
more complex in form than the previous ones. This is because they contain not just the case data 
pairs for the 1
st wave of assessments, but also the scores for the longer-term assessments of 
strategic  momentum,  obtained  during  the  2
nd  wave  of  interviews,  4-6  years  after  the  SDM 
process had been completed. In the plots, this is visualised by vertical arrows showing the delta 
from the original measurement to the later one.  
What we can distil from these complex charts is that there is a clear positive impact from 
more rational analysis, some positive impact from “cultural behaviour”, i.e., open and active 
communication, and that there was no clearly observable relation between political behaviour 
and strategic momentum in these six cases. The scores for the data contained in these plots can 
be found in Table 3 above and Table 4 below.  
The impact of rationality on strategic momentum  
A SDM process in which rational analysis plays an important part would appear to reinforce both 
the level of learning taken place as well as the collective commitment to translate that learning 
into action. Such becomes apparent from glancing over the two scatter plots in Figure 3. This is 
true for the assessments shortly after the formal SDM process as well as four years later, only 
then with considerably lower reported levels of insights gained. Look for instance at the data for 
Case  2:  an  outlier  in  the  first  wave  of  data,  since  one  would  expect  either  more  rational 
behaviour or a lower state of strategic momentum here. But, interestingly, this is also a case 
where six years strategic momentum is found to be much lower than in most cases.  
   22 
Figure 3 
Scatter Plots of Rational Behaviour versus Insights Gained and Collective 
Commitment (1
st and 2





















































The impact of politics on strategic momentum  
It is not possible to spot clear trends from the two scatter plots in Figure 4 for the level of 
political behaviour in the SDM process versus insights gained and collective commitment. At 
least partly, this is an issue of available data range. In the six cases studied, on average politics 
remained limited, with the clear exception of Case 4, a very much politically loaded setting 
indeed.    So,  we  observe  a  cluster  of  limited  political  behaviour  and  considerable  strategic 
momentum on the one hand, and  a singe case, Case 4, with high political activity and low 
strategic readiness on the other hand.  
The fit is relatively better for the first-wave data. There, cases 1 and 6 appear to be outliers to 
some extent. Case 6 scores lower than might be expected on insight, but we know that this 
process was abandoned prematurely, resulting in fewer analytic findings than required. And we 
do find Case 1 with better insight and collective commitment than expected, but we know that 
the political behaviour in this case took place mainly outside of the group of middle managers 
who participated directly in the SDM process and who were interviewed afterwards. Four to six 
years later, the data do not suggest any clear patterns any longer.  
 
Figure 4 
Scatter Plots of Political Behaviour versus Insights Gained and Collective 
Commitment (1
st and 2
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The impact of cultural behaviour on strategic momentum  
The scatter plots in Figure 5, which show the  data for supportive cultural behaviour versus 
insights gained and collective commitment, appear to be somewhat half-way between those for 
rationality  and  politics.  That  is,  where  the  plots  for  rationality  strongly  suggest  a  positive 
relationship and the data for the impact of politics are clearly inconclusive, especially for the 
longer-term,  Figure  5  suggests  some  correlation,  but  a  fairly  weak  one.  The  link  between 
supportive  cultural  behaviour  and  collective  commitment  here  is  the  clearest  one.  Since  the 
scores for collective commitment remain stable over time as we will see, this link is upheld for 




Scatter Plots of Cultural Behaviour versus Insights Gained and Collective 
Commitment (1
st and 2



















































Sustainability of strategic momentum 
Our third research question concerned the sustainability of strategic momentum. We stated that, 
from a perspective of organisational change, a strategic momentum that dies out relatively soon 
is of little value to the organisation. Perhaps the most surprising finding from out data analysis is 
that, in the six cases evaluated, the relative levels of strategic momentum were very robust, even 
some five to six years after the original SDM process proper had taken place. This is shown in 
Table 4, which contains the results of the two waves of data gathering on SDM outcomes.  
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TABLE 4 
Results of Two Waves (1992-1994 and 1998) of Data Gathering on SDM outcomes 


























1  6  ++  +  ++/+  +  +  + 
2  6  ++/+  -/+  +/-  +/-  -/+  - 
3  5  ++  +/-  ++/+  ++  +/-  -- 
4  5  +/-  --  --/-  --  -/+  -- 
5  4  +  +/-  ++/+  ++/+  +  ++ 
6  4  +/-  +/-  ++/+  +  -/+  - 
 
This is especially the case for collective commitment. Here, in two cases the original level has 
actually gone up since then (Cases 1 and 3) and on average remains at a stable high level of + 
(and even higher without the outlier of case 4). This contrasts with the delta in the perceived 
level of insight gained from the SDM process, which is greater, on average a change from + to 
+/-.   
 
DISCUSSION 
Reflection: SDM back to the roots of strategy? 
In this article, we have presented our concept of strategic momentum as the desired outcome of 
SDM in turbulent settings as a novel one. We might as well have introduced it as the revival of a 
very old one. If we look back beyond the thirty-odd years of modern strategy theory into history, 
we find many parallels in what many consider to be the basis of modern strategic thinking, i.e., 
theories about how best to conduct warfare.  
Over two-and-a-half millennium ago, the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu already stressed the need 
for  “insight”  in  turbulent  settings,  for  what  we  have  called  rationality  in  the  SDM  process 
leading to insights gained, as becomes apparent from the short quote from his “The Art of War” 
at the beginning of this article (Wing 1989). Likewise, over one-and-a half century ago, von 
Clausewitz stressed that the most carefully thought-out plan is likely to become obsolete as a 
result of unforeseen events and reactions of the enemy. Specific decisions made beforehand are 
of little use in the turbulent setting of war, as the adjacent quote from his classic “On War” from 
1832 indicates (von Clausewitz 1997). What these classical authors do not emphasise and we do 
in our concept of strategic momentum is the group aspect of insight and commitment, which 
comes so natural to us in our modern organisational life. They still write for the lonely man at the 
top, not for his loyal band of fellow decision-makers. Perhaps this may then count as a modern 
innovation to the classical adage that “no battle-plan survives first contact with the  enemy” 
(Hindle 2002).  
Limitations and suggestions for further research 
The  research  reported  here  is  one  of  the  few  empirical  investigations  of  SDM  outcomes 
operating  from  a  change  focus.  By  necessity,  our  exploratory  research  effort  has  several 
shortcomings. Two of these are quite obvious and are related to the nature of our sample size of 
six cases. Two others are more subtle and refer to the timing of our observations.    25 
Firstly, there is the problem of only six cases. This makes our dataset rather limited, which is 
especially cumbersome if there is little variation in the variables of interest. One clear example is 
the fact that most of our cases contained little political behaviour, which makes it difficult to 
assess the impact of politics during the SDM process on strategic momentum.  
Another shortcoming regarding our sample size is that we have not taken into account the 
nature of the content of the issue at stake on the SDM process and outcome. Both Hickson et al. 
(1986) and Nutt (1993a, 1993b) suggest that the nature of the decision content influences the 
decision-making  mode  and  hence,  possibly,  the  quality  demands  with  respect  to  the  SDM 
process. Of our six cases, four were clearly related to operations management issues, the two 
others also so to a lesser extent, which leaves little room for assessing the impact of content. 
Two other shortcomings of this research have to do with the fact that it is only longitudinal in 
a very limited sense: we have measured SDM process outcomes at two points in time only.  
What we cannot say on the basis of our data is how strategic momentum evolves over time. We 
only know that, in the successful cases we investigated, it was surprisingly robust after four to 
six years. There are at least two areas in which this is especially unfortunate. One is that it would 
be  nice  to  see  if  strategic  momentum  would  remain  equality  solid  in  settings  of  extreme 
turbulence, such as  in a refugee camp in Africa (Mintzberg 2001). This would address the 
interesting question of how the half-life of strategic momentum depends on the turbulence of the 
setting. 
A  final  shortcoming  of  the  present  research  and,  at  the  same  time,  an  opportunity  for 
qualitative, longitudinal follow-up research, is that of the relation between strategic momentum 
and  business  results.  We  have  established  that  specific  the  dependence  between  specific 
decisions  and  business  results  is  problematic,  certainly  in  turbulent  settings.  But,  would  the 
relation  between  strategic  momentum  and  business  results  be  equally  problematic?  These 
questions would be our suggested battle plan going forward.  
 
Managerial implications  
As a recent Economist article has pointed out, although many strategic planning departments 
have been closed in the past decade, this does not mean that strategic planning itself is out of 
favour with senior managers (Hindle 2002). On the contrary, the “fine art of being prepared” is 
more important than ever. Managerial implications of this are to twofold. Firstly, do not search 
for a single strategic plan that can solve all business problems, but rather make your ability to 
think strategically so strong and flexible that you can put almost any plan in action, depending on 
the circumstances of the time.  
Secondly, aim to develop groups of managers that can think strategically; encourage them to 
look beyond the current business issue and today’s horizon and think fundamentally about the 
nature of their business, as a group. This will be well worth the investment: as our research 
suggests, this investment will still pay off many years later, for as long as this group stays on 
board. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have developed a research model for Strategic Decision-Making in turbulent settings based 
on a change focus. In this model the desired direct outcome of a well-designed SDM-process is 
not only an initial choice – as is the case for models on the basis of a choice focus – but also the 
resulting strategic momentum, defined as the combination of insight and collective commitment. 
In  our  model  the  quality  of  the  SDM-process  is  driven  by  rational,  political  and  cultural 
behaviour.   26 
   In our evaluation of six cases of SDM processes, we have found that the relation between 
strategic  momentum  and  direct  organisational  action  is  an  unclear  one,  as  a  result  of 
environmental turbulence. We have also found that rational behaviour during the SDM process 
indeed  has  a  positive  impact  on  both  insight  and  commitment  and  that  cultural  behaviour 
stressing open communication has positive impact on commitment. We have not found a clear 
relation between political behaviour an on strategic momentum in our cases studied. Perhaps our 
most surprising empirical finding was that high quality SDM-processes do indeed lead to a level 
of strategic momentum that can be sustained for at least four to six years after the original SDM 
process has taken place. 
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